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ANTIDUMPING-REDEFINITION OF CONFIDENTIALITY AND
RIGHT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW - INSTITUTION OF A NEW FORM
OF RELIEF: Timex Corporation v. Council and Commission
of the European Communities
I. FACTS
In June 1980, the British Clock and Watch Manufacturers' As-
sociation Limited, on behalf of the manufacturers of mechanical
watches in France and the United Kingdom, lodged a complaint with
the Commission of the European Communities.' The complaint in-
volved the dumping of mechanical watches and watch movements
produced in the Soviet Union and dumped in the European market. 2
In response to the complaint, Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 84/
82 was adopted on January 14, 1982. 3 That regulation imposed a
provisional antidumping duty on all Soviet-produced wrist watches
dumped in the European Community. Council Regulation (EEC) No.
1072/82 extended the provisional duty on May 4, 1982,1 and on July
12, 1982, a definitive antidumping duty was adopted in Council
Regulation (EEC) No. 1882/82.6 The scope of these regulations was
limited to assembled wrist watches and did not impose any anti-
dumping duty, provisional or definitive, on the movements of such
watches.I
I The antidumping proceeding opened pursuant to that complaint ended in the
adoption of Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 84/82, imposing a provisional duty
on mechanical wrist watches originating in the Soviet Union. Commission Regulation
(EEC) No. 84/82, Jan. 14, 1982, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. Ll1/14) (1982).
I d.
Id.
Id.
Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1072/82, May 4, 1982, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L125/1) (1982).
6 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1882/82, July 12, 1982, 25 O.J. EuR. COMM.
(No. 207/1) (1982). The rate of duty imposed by article I of that regulation, equal
to the dumping margin found, was 12.607o for watches without gold plating of a
thickness not exceeding five microns and 26.4% for watches with gold plating of a
thickness exceeding five microns. !d.
' Id. In regard to mechanical watch movements, the preamble to Commission
Regulation No. 84/82 states:
[A]s regards mechanical watch movements, the Commission has deter-
mined that, while there are substantial margins of dumping, the low level
of market penetration and the effect of the quantitative restrictions in force
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During the original Commission proceedings, Timex Corporation
of Dundee, Scotland,' on whose behalf the action had been instituted, 9
was denied opportunity to inspect information obtained by the Com-
mission for purposes of determining appropriate antidumping duties. 0
According to Timex, the resulting duties proved wholly inadequate,
especially insofar as they did not pertain to unassembled mechanical
watch movements."I
On September 27, 1982, Timex Corporation filed an action against
the Commission of the European Communities and the Council of
the European Communities for the partial annulment of article 1 of
Regulation No. 1882/82. 2 Timex alleged that such regulation was
adopted in breach of substantive and procedural rules laid down in
the parent regulation, Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 3017/79
of December 20, 1979,13 and in the EEC Treaty. 4 Upon hearing
before the Court of Justice of the European Communities, article I
of Regulation No. 1882/82, held, void. The antidumping duties adopted
by the article are inadequate to protect the interests of Timex and
other manufacturers of mechanical watches and watch movements,
but shall be maintained until the competent institutions adopt re-
placement measures sufficient to comply with the court's judgment. 5
in France are such that material injury is not being caused and there is no
threat that it will be caused.
Commission Regulation No. 84/82, supra note 1, at preamble. Mechanical watch
movements are not mentioned in the preamble to Council Regulation No. 1882/82,
however.
Timex Corporation is the leading manufacturer of mechanical watches and
watch movements in the European Community and the only manufacturer of those
products in the United Kingdom. Timex Corporation v. Council of the European
Communities, No. 264/82 (E. Comm. Ct. J. Mar. 20, 1985) at 6.
9 The complaint which led to the adoption of Regulation No. 1882/82 was lodged
by the British Clock and Watch Manufacturers' Association Limited on behalf of
manufacturers of mechanical watches in France and the United Kingdom. The
Association filed the complaint after one lodged by Timex in April 1979 was rejected
by the Commission on the ground that it came from only one Community manu-
facturer. Timex, No. 264/82, at 9. Similarly, Timex was joined in its later action
by the Federal Republic of Germany, the French Clock and Watchmakers' Asso-
ciation, and the Pforzheimer Uhren-Rohworks Parta GmbH & Co. Id. at 6-7.
See allegations made by Timex. Timex, No. 264/82, at 11-18.
Id.
,2 Timex, supra note 8.
,I Id.; see Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 3017/79, Dec. 20, 1979, 22 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. L. 339/1) (1979).
'4 See Treaties Establishing the European Communities, done at Rome, March
25, 1957, art. 173, 298 U.N.T.S. 75 [hereinafter cited as Treaty of Rome].
" Timex, No. 264/82, at 20-21.
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1I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Antidumping' 6 regulations such as those in dispute in Timex date
from around the turn of the century.' 7 At that time, the governments
of most major trading nations, while attempting to avoid a general
increase in tariffs, were anxious to find means of controlling imports
adversely affecting domestic industries. 8 To protect these domestic
markets, governments began taking unilateral measures against dump-
ing. 9 The particular antidumping practices adopted varied from coun-
try to country. 20
Prior to the outbreak of World War II, however, the major in-
dustrial nations of the world became dissatisfied with existing systems
for trade protection. 2' The fluctuating tariffs and quotas used by
most countries proved inadequate to protect domestic markets; world
trade had continued to decline and unemployment had risen. 22 Prior
'6 The applicable GATT and EEC provisions hold a product to be "dumped"
where its export price is less than the "normal value" of a like product, usually as
compared to the home market price of the exporting country. Prior to the adoption
of these provisions:
... the practice of "dumping" has been roughly defined as an unfair
practice under which low price exports were subsidized in order to capture
a new market or to unload unsaleable goods. In due course, however, this
concept became more refined and assumed a more technical meaning.
D. LASOK & W. CAIRNS, THE CUSTOMS LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
239 (1983) [hereinafter cited as LASOK & CAIRNS]; see General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT), opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, EEC, art. VI, 61 Stat. A-
11, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
"7 C. STANBROOK, DUMPING: A MANUAL ON THE EEC ANTI-DUMPING LAW AND
PROCEDURE 5 (1980); see J. VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
(1966).
'" STANBROOK, supra note 17, at 5.
19 Id.
2" See, e.g., VINER, supra note 17, at 192-273 (1966) (detailing foreign and United
States antidumping legislation).
Anti-dumping legislation made its appearance in response to the clamor
raised against the allegedly injurious effects of American and German
dumping. In 1904 Canada enacted the first anti-dumping law specifically
providing for additional duties on imports sold at dumping prices. Other
countries followed Canada's lead, such as the Union of South Africa in
1914 and the United States, Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand and
Newfoundland in 1921. Some of these acts applied mandatory duties upon
"dumped" products while others were applied at the discretion of customs
and other authorities.
Id. at 378.
_' STANBROOK, supra note 17, at 6. The major trading nations of that time included
Great Britain, the United States, and most of the Western European nations. Id.
22 Id.
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to 1939 the United States, under Franklin Roosevelt, led a reform
movement concentrated on lowering tariffs and eliminating quotas. 23
At the close of World War II, the United States, with the help of
Great Britain, renewed its efforts to foster reforms in the methods
used to protect domestic markets from outside competition.24 Reform
of these protection systems was aimed at preventing a recurrence of
the type of worldwide depression experienced in the 1930's.25
In 1946, the newly-formed United Nations Economic and Social
Council adopted a resolution to convene the United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Employment, and assembled a committee to
prepare for the conference.2 6 Preliminary meetings of the committee,
held in New York and Geneva, generated proposals for an Inter-
national Trade Organization (ITO) 27 and the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).2" The ITO failed due to lack of United
23 Id.
24 Id. The proposals of Britain and the United States involved utilizing three
instruments - a central bank, a developmental bank, and an international trade
organization - to stabilize and refine international trade policy. The creation of
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank followed from these
proposals. The formation of a worldwide trade organization, however, proved un-
workable. Id.; see infra note 27 and accompanying text.
2' STANBROOK, supra note 17 at 6.
Although there were a number of international congresses to coordinate
customs administration dating back as far as 1900, none of these developed
a successful program of international discipline or international economic
behavior. This failure was viewed by many as a primary cause of both the
Great Depression and World War II. As a result, a multinational effort at
the close of World War II sought to develop a viable set of international
economic rules.
Jackson, Louis, & Matsushita, Implementing the Tokyo Round: Legal Aspects of
Changing International Economic Rules, 81 MICH. L. REV. 267, at 270 (1982); see
JACKSON, Louis, & MATSUSHITA, IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND (1984) [hereinafter
referred to as Tokyo Round Book] (giving more detailed description of the events
leading to the Depression and World War II).
26 Jackson, Louis, & Matsushita, supra note 25, at 270.
21 Id. The executive branch in the United States had been a major supporter of
such an international trade regulatory body, but Congress refused to pass it. Absent
support from the United States, the major economic power in the world at the time,
the ITO had no chance for success. Id.
21 Id. The GATT is more a framework for action (an agreement to agree) than
a document of fixed legal rules. T. SCHOENBAUM, M. MATSUSHITA, & G. WILNER,
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS, 31 (1984)
(unpublished manuscript).
When it was originally drafted, the GATT was intended to be a multilateral
agreement preliminary to a charter for an international trade organization
that was to be created later. Due primarily to opposition from the United
[Vol. 16:179
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States support; 29 the GATT, however, was applied as international
law by the Protocol of Provisional Application.3 °
Adoption of the GATT resulted in several rounds of formal ne-
gotiations on reduction of international tariff barriers. 3' Utilizing the
GATT as a basis, the adopting countries3 2 attempted to stimulate
States Congress, no international trade organization was ever agreed upon.
The GATT has therefore become an international trade organization, but
it rests on an inadequate constitutional and institutional basis. The United
States and other governments accept it as the chief international trade forum
for the resolution of trade problems.
Id. at 38-39.
The GATT is a multilateral treaty intended to provide the framework
for the progressive elimination of tariff barriers. The agreement embodies
the "most favored nation" principle, whereby any privilege or favor granted
by a contracting party to the products of any other country in respect of
custom duties or charges shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally
to similar products originating in the territory of any other contracting
party. The Agreement prohibits quantitative restrictions (subject to certain
exceptions), restricts measures such as imposing internal taxation of a higher
rate on imports than on domestic products and charging fees in excess of
cost for custom services, and promotes periodic "rounds" for negotiations
on world tariff levels.
D. WYATT & A. DASHWOOD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EEC 18-19 (1980).
21 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
"I Protocol of Provisional Application of the GATT, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A.
2051, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 308. The original signatories, which include
Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United
Kingdom, and the United States, signed the Protocol to make the GATT operative
provisionally as an international trade agreement. Id. Such implementation was
necessary since the GATT was originally intended to supplement the ITO, which
never came into being. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
11 D. WYATT & A. DASHWOOD, supra note 28, at 19. Under the auspices of the
GATT, there have been seven major "rounds" of tariff and trade negotiations. The
first five of these rounds (the 1947 Geneva negotiation of the original GATT; a
1949 round in Annecy, France; 1950 in Torquay, England; 1955 in Geneva; and
the 1955 "Dillon Round") were primarily item-by-item negotiations for the reduction
of tariffs, with very little attention paid to nontariff barriers. Because of the growing
complexity of this sort of negotiation, the sixth round of tariff reductions (the
"Kennedy Round") attempted a "linear tariff reduction" approach. It set the goal
of a 50 percent, across-the-board cut in tariffs. The Kennedy Round also attempted
to address major nontariff barriers. The seventh trade round was launched in
September 1973 in Tokyo, and thus the name "Tokyo Round." Although this
negotiation contained a signficant element of tariff reduction, a larger part of the
activity in the Tokyo Round focused on a variety of nontariff barriers. Jackson,
Louis, & Matsushita, supra note 25, at 271; see also infra note 34 and accompanying
text.
32 As of February 1983, 88 countries had acceded to the GATT; Tunisia had
acceded provisionally. In addition, 30 countries apply the GATT on a defacto basis.
T. SCHOENBAUM, M. MATSUSHITA, & G. WILNER, supra note 28, at 38.
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international trade by uniformly limiting their individual trade pro-
tection policies.33 The most significant achievement of the early rounds
of the GATT negotiations was the formulation of the 1967 Anti-
Dumping Code.3 4
One of the most notable developments in the area of antidumping
regulation since 1968 came about at the "Tokyo Round" of the
GATT in 1979. That conference resulted in the Agreement for Im-
plementation of article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, better known as the Anti-Dumping Code of 1979 (ADC). 3 5
The ADC was formally incorporated as article VI of the GATT in
1979.36
In addition to the GATT provisions on dumping, the EEC has a
history of standardized antidumping regulation originating in the 1957
Treaty of Rome.3 7 Utilizing powers granted by the Treaty of Rome
and the provisions of the GATT, the Council of the European Com-
munities and the Commission of the European Communities3 8 de-
3' JACKSON, Louis, & MATSUSHITA (Tokyo Round Book), supra note 25, at 11-
13.
" Jackson, Louis, & Matsushita, supra note 25, at 271. The 1967 GATT Anti-
Dumping Code [hereinafter referred to as the 1967 ADC] "may be viewed as an
attempt to state an international consensus about the correct policy and practice of
national antidumping laws." Hudec, United States Compliance with the 1967 GA TT
Antidumping Code, I MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 205 (1979).
11 Jackson, Louis, & Matsushita, supra note 25, at 273. "At a late day in Tokyo
Round, it was decided to revise the (1967) Anti-Dumping Code, and to enter into
a new code which embodied many of the concepts that had already been negotiated
in the Subsidies-Countervailing Duty Code." Id. The Anti-Dumping Code and the
Subsidies and Countervailing Duties Code were incorporated into a single regulation.
In the EEC, that single regulation was adopted "for protection against dumped or
subsidized imports from countries which are not members of the [EEC]." Id. This
regulation, effective January 1, 1980, assured a strict parallelism between international
and inter-Community law. Id. at 291; see also Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3017/
79, supra note 13.
3. Id.
" Article 113 of the treaty provides that by 1968, "a common commercial policy
should be established within the Community." Treaty of Rome, supra note 14, art.
113. Article 91 deals with dumping between member states during the transitional
periods prior to membership. Id. art. 91.
11 The Treaty of Rome states the general duties of the Council and Commission
as follows:
To ensure that the objectives of the [t]reaty are attained, the Council,
in accordance with the [tireaty's provisions, is to ensure coordination of
the general economic policies of the member states and have power to take
decisions.
Id. art. 145.
In order to ensure the proper functioning and development of the common market,
[Vol. 16:179
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veloped a series of specialized regulations establishing antidumping
practices and procedures for the Community.3 9
The most important regulation adopted concerning dumping of
products other than coal and steel was Council Regulation No. 3017/
79.40 This regulation expanded upon the ideas of the ADC and served
as the parent regulation for EEC antidumping regulations.4 Regu-
lation 3017/79 was created to protect against dumped or subsidized
imports from countries not members of the EEC. 4 The regulation
was intended to define dumping and to clarify procedures for the
institution of antidumping actions and the imposition of duties. 43
the Commission shall:
- ensure that the provisions of this treaty and the measures taken by
the institutions pursuant thereto are applied;
- formulate recommendations or deliver opinions on matters dealt with
in this Treaty, if it expressly so provides or if the Commission considers
it necessary;
- have its own power of decision and participate in the shaping of
measures taken by the Council and by the Assembly in the manner provided
for by this Treaty;
- exercise the powers conferred on it by the Council for the imple-
mentation of the rules laid down by the latter.
Id. art. 155. The Commission, thus, performs many investigative tasks while the
council handles many legislative functions.
19 Two sources of rules provide the legal framework for the EEC's protective
measures against the dumping of imports. First, the EEC is committed under in-
ternational law to observe the provisions of article VI of the GATT as elaborated
in the Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping Code. These instruments provide detailed rules
concerning most aspects of the antidumping system and specify the conditions under
which definitive action may be taken. Second, under Community law, two sets of
rules have been issued governing EEC antidumping procedures. C. STANBROOK,
supra note 17, at 11. The first set of rules, Commission Recommendation ECSC
3018/79, applies to dumping involving products under the authority of the European
Coal and Steel Community. All other products are governed by the second set of
rules, embodied in Council Regulation (EEC) 3017/79. Id.
40 Id. The regulation formally recognizes the provisions of the 1979 Anti-Dumping
Code (1979 ADC) of the Tokyo Round of the GATT and gives effect to these
provisions in its preamble. Article 1 applies the provisions of the regulation to
"dumped or subsidized imports from countries not members of the [EEC]." Article
2 defines "dumping" and the applicable terms related to dumping. Article 3 regulates
subsidies. Article 4 defines "injury" as required in bringing an action against dumped
or subsidized products. Subsequent articles discuss procedures governing institution
of proceedings, duties, and review. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3017/79, supra
note 13.
4' See the preamble to Regulation 3017/79, id., at No. L339/1 (detailing the many
purposes for which the Regulation was adopted, including those mentioned herein).
42 Article I, id. at No. L339/2.
41 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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III. ALLEGATIONS
The regulation in dispute in the Timex case" had its origins in the
parent Regulation 3017/79. 41 Specifically, Timex alleged that in cre-
ating Regulation 1882/82, the Council and Commission violated the
provisions of 3017/79 dealing with price comparisons. 46 Timex con-
tended that the resulting duty formulated by the Council and Com-
mission was too low to protect Timex from injury caused by dumping.4 7
According to Timex, the Commission's failure to provide adequate
information about prices used by the Commission for comparisons
in the original antidumping action 4 prevented Timex from adequately
presenting its case for a higher duty.4 9
44 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1882/82. July 12, 1982, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. 207/1)(1982). The preamble to this regulation makes several references to Regula-
tion 3017/79, especially to article 12 of such regulation. Id.
41 Article 12 of Regulation 3017/79 states, in pertinent part, "where the facts
are finally established to show that there is dumping or subsidization and injury
caused thereby, and the interests of the Community call for Community intervention,
a definitive antidumping or countervailing duty shall be imposed by the Council,
acting by qualified majority on a proposal submitted by the Commission after
consultation." Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3017/79, supra note 13, at No. L339/
10.
, See article 2 of 3017/79, which describes how "normal value" shall be deter-
mined and defines "export price," "comparison," "like product," and "dumping
margin." Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3017/79, supra note 13, at No. L339/3;
see also article 13 setting out "general provisions on duties." Id. at No. L339/1 1,
and infra note 48.
47 Timex, No. 264/82, at 6.
4 Article 2, section 5 of 3017/79 provides:
In the case of imports from non-market economy countries . . . normal
value shall be determined in an appropriate and not unreasonable manner
on the basis of the following criteria:
(a) The price of which the like product of a market economy third
country is actually sold:
(i) for consumption on the domestic market of that country, or
(ii) to other countries, including the Community ....
Council Regulation 3017/79, supra note 13, at No. L339/3.
"Like product" is defined in article 2, section 12 as "a product which is identical,
i.e., alike in all respects, to the product under consideration, or, in the absence of
such a product, another product which has characteristics closely resembling those
of the product under consideration." Id. at No. L339/5.
Pursuant to these provisions, watch movements and their prices were provided
by Hong Kong manufacturers for comparison in place of the Soviet products. Those
products were selected for similarity in their outward appearance to that of the
Soviet products. Timex, No. 264/82, at 16.
"1 Id. In the original antidumping action, the Commission provided Timex "only
a list of movements selected in France and considered comparable to the Soviet
movements and a 'scheme showing . . . how the normal vlaue was constructed'
which, however, consisted only of a list of mechanical watch parts and other price
Timex Corp. v. Council
The Commission withheld the price figures obtained from watch
manufacturers in Hong Kong under the authority of article 8 of
Regulation 3017/79.50 Timex contended, however, that article 7(4)(a)
of the same regulation dictated that parties to such an action are
entitled to inspect information "when it is relevant to the defense of
their interests."'" According to Timex, the information should not
have been deemed confidential under article 8 because no request for
confidentiality had been made by the Hong Kong manufacturers, and
because methods were available to release such information in a form
which would protect the business interests of the manufacturers and
still prove useful to Timex .
2
When the measures adopted pursuant to the original antidumping
action proved unsatisfactory to Timex, it instituted a formal action
for nullification of article 1 of Regulation 1882/82.13 In that action,
Timex alleged that the Council and Commission violated Regulation
301.7/79 as well as certain portions of the Treaty of Rome.14
IV. DECISION
The Court of Justice of the European Community agreed to hear
Timex's case under authority granted to it by article 173 of the Treaty
of Rome. 5 Additional authority was provided by a similar case before
the court in 1983, EEC Seed Crushers' and Oil Producers' Federation
v. Commission (the Fediol case).5 6 The court in Fediol stated:
components without any corresponding figures and which was therefore of no use
to Timex." Id. at 17.
- For pertinent sections of article 8, see Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3017/
79, supra note 13, and accompanying text.
Timex, No. 264/82, at 12.
. Id. at 14.
Id. at 6.
54 Id.
" Id. at 7-10. Article 173 of the Treaty provides that the Court of Justice shall
have the power to review the legality of acts of the Council and Commission (other
than recommendations or opinions) "on grounds of lack of competence, infringement
of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of this [tireaty or of any rule
of law relating to its application, or misuse of powers." It further provides, "Any
natural or legal person may . . . institute proceedings against a decision addressed
to that person or against a decision which, although in the form of a regulation
. . . is of direct and individual concern to the former." Treaty of Rome, supra note
14, art. 173. The court ruled that Timex was eligible to bring an action under such
article. Timex, No. 264/82, at 7-12. See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
-6 EEC Seed Crushers' and Oil Processors' Federation [Fediol] v. Commission
of the European Communities, 1983 E.C.R. 2913 (1983). Though Fediol was an
anti-subsidies case, it answered questions pertinent to antidumping actions as well.
Id.; see Bellis, infra note 64.
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[Applicants are entited to] put before the [cjourt any matters
which would facilitate a review as to whether the Commission has
observed the procedural guarantees granted to complainants by Reg-
ulation No. 3017/79 and whether or not it has committeed manifest
errors in its assessment of the facts, has omitted to take any essential
matters into consideration, or has based the reasons for its decision
on considerations amounting to a misuse of powers.
5 7
In deciding the Timex case, the court agreed that Timex had not
been provided adequate information as required by article 7(4)(a) of
Regulation 3017/79.58 The court, therefore, nullified article 1 of Reg-
ulation 1882/82 as having been imposed in breach of article 7(4)(a)
of Regulation 3017/79.19 The court, however, allowed the article to
remain in operation until the appropriate institutions take action to
modify the duty. 6°
V. COMMENT
In the Timex case, the Court of Justice clarified its position on
several previously unclear points of procedure. Consequently, the
court's decision in Timex represents a significant step in the rapidly
developing 6' area of EEC antidumping regulation.
The court's procedural clarifications came in three major areas.
First, by allowing Timex to bring the action, the court demonstrated
its willingness to afford individual complainants in annulment actions
an opportunity for judicial review. Second, the court instituted a new
51 Fediol, 1983 E.C.R. at 2935 (quoted in Timex, No. 264/82, at 11).
-1 Timex, No. 264/82, at 16. The court, interpreting article 7(4)(a), stated "[AIll
non-confidential information, whether supplied by a Community undertaking or an
undertaking in a non-member country, which has been used by the Commission
during its investigation and which has a decisive influence on its decision regarding
the anti-dumping duty must be made available to the complainant requesting it."
Fediol, 1983 E.C.R. 2913 (1983).
19 Timex, No. 264/82, at 18-19.
60 Id. The court allowed the regulation to stand, in the interim, citing as authority
for such an action article 174 of the Treaty of Rome. Id. That article states:
If the action is well founded, the Court of Justice shall declare the act
concerned to be void.
In the case of a regulation, however, the Court of Justice shall, if it
considers this necessary, state which of the effects of the regulation which
it has declared void shall be considered as definitive.
Treaty of Rome, supra note 14, art. 174.
61 For a discussion of the increased number of antidumping cases brought before
the European Court of Justice in recent years, see Vermulst, Dumping in the United
States and the European Community: A Comparative Analysis, 1984 L.I.E.I. 103,
at 133-147 (1984).
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form of relief which addresses the needs of complainants more ad-
equately than does immediate annulment. Finally, the court re-ex-
amined the level of information which must be provided to parties
in an antidumping action and limited the Council's discretion to
withhold information on the basis of confidentiality.
Until quite recently, cases involving complainants seeking increased
duties had been rare; 62 as a result, the precedential value of such
cases was limited and unclear. 63 For example, prior to Timex, whether
individual complainants such as Timex could assert a right to be
heard by the Court of Justice at all was unclear. 64 Timex, however,
' See supra note 60.
61 See, e.g., The Japanese Ballbearing Cases, joined cases 113, 118-121/77, 1979 E.C.R.
1185 (1979); NTN Toyo Bearing Company, Ltd. and Others v. Council of the European
Communities, 1979 E.C.R. 1185 (1979) (carefully limited to peculiar facts; thus, the
precedential value of such a case is unclear); Vermulst, supra note 61, at 146; see
id. at 139-140 (a discussion of the apparent irreconcilability of the Ballbearing Cases
with the Alusuisse case, Alusuisse Italia Spa v. Council and Commission of the
European Communities, 1982 E. COMM. CT. J. REP. 3463, on the point of admis-
sibility of cases for judicial review).
- Paragraph 2 of article 173 of the Treaty of Rome states that "any natural or
legal person may . . . institute proceedings against . .. a decision which, although
in the form of a regulation . . . is of direct and individual concern to the former."
Treaty of Rome, supra note 14, art. 2 (emphasis added). The defendants in Timex
contended that the regulation did not concern Timex because Timex was not spe-
cifically mentioned by the regulation, and because the regulation affects all man-
ufacturers of mechanical wrist watches in the Community alike. Timex, No. 264/
82, at 7. Such a contention had barred claims in previous cases. See, e.g., Ballbearing
Cases, supra note 63 (excluding some manufacturers on grounds that they were not
specifically mentioned by the regulation in question).
Regulation No. 3017/79, the basic EEC anti-dumping . . . legislation does
not make any provision for judicial review. The matter therefore has to
be examined solely under article 173 of the EEC Treaty and more specifically
article 173(2) concerning actions by individuals. Article 173(2) provides that
individuals may institute proceedings against decisions addressed to them
as well as against regulations insofar as they constitute "decisions in the
form of a regulation" which are "of direct and individual concern" to
such individuals. This latter provision, which has generally been restrictively
construed by the court, is of great significance in anti-dumping . . . cases
as anti-dumping ... duties . . . are imposed by regulation.
Bellis, Judicial Review of EEC Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Determinations After
Fediol: The Emergence of a New Admissibility Test, 21 COMMON MKT. L. REV.
539, 540 (1984).
[Tihe right of private parties to bring an annulment action is considerably
narrower as compared with that of the member states or of the Community
institutions. This difference concerns not only the conditions under which
this action may be brought but also the nature and origin of acts which
may be impugned and the grounds of illegality charged.
G. BEBR, DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 21
(1981).
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expanded upon the court's decision in Fedio165 to give a clearer
definition of complainants' rights to judicial review. 66
In hearing the Timex case, the court demonstrated its willingness
to review actions for annulment brought by individual complainants. 67
This willingness represents a significant departure from earlier court
decisions. 6 Until recently, individual complainants were thought barred
from bringing such actions except in the case of a "decision which,
though in the form of a regulation . . . is of direct and individual
concern to the [individual complainant] '"69 as provided by article 173
61 Complainants' standing to sue under article 173 was examined by the court
for the first time in Fediol. See Fediol, supra note 56. In that case, the court's
search for an appropriate admissibility test led it to shift the focus of the admissibility
inquiry from the nature of the contested measure (which had been the focus of the
test prior to Fediol) to that of the proceeding leading to that measure. In the
subsequent Allied case, the court similarly focused on the complainants' involvement
in the proceeding leading to adoption of the measure. See Allied Corp. v. Com-
mission, Joined Cases 239/82 and 275/82, 1985 E.C.R. 1005 (1984). This suggests
that complainants need not be named in a regulation to have standing to challenge
it. They need only participate in such proceedings to be "individually concerned"
by the regulation. Bellis, supra note 64, at 541-549.
See the court's discussion of Fediol in Timex, No. 264-82, at 10-11. The court
applied the language of Fediol entitling parties directly concerned with a regulation
to judicial review to the fact pattern of the Timex case. Id. at 9-11. The court's
application of the Fediol standard to a complainant such as Timex seems to expand
the applicability of the Fediol rule. Fediol concerned an EEC federation while Timex
applied to an individual manufacturer.
66 Id. The court in Timex stated the traditional rule, "In light of the criteria set
out in the second paragraph of article 173 [of the Treaty of Rome] the measures
in question are, in fact, legislative in nature and scope, inasmuch as they apply to
traders in general," but the court immediately added, "nevertheless, their provisions
may be of direct and individual concern to some of those traders." Id. at 9. The
latter phrase of that sentence modified considerably the general rule, and arguably
decided the entire admissibility issue in favor of Timex.
61 The court in Timex did not limit the application of its ruling to the specific
factual pattern involved as severely as it had in the Ballbearing Cases, nor did it
limit itself by using the fact that Timex was mentioned specifically in the preamble
to Regulation 1882/82, as it might have under article 173. While the court mentioned
both of these facts, it made neither the single basis of its admissibility decision. See
id. at 7-11.
61 See Rasmussen, Why is Article 173 Interpreted Against Private Plaintiffs?, 5
EUR. L. REV. 112 (detailing the history and rationale of the court's denial of review
to individuals under article 173).
69 Treaty of Rome, supra note 14, art. 173. "Regulations are defined by the EEC
Treaty as being of general application, binding in their entirety, and as being directly
applicable to all member states; ... They are essentially acts of a legislative nature,
not of an administrative nature. Regulations are traditionally used to implement the
Community's commercial policies ...." Oldekop & Van Bael, European Antidumping
Law and Procedure, I MICH. Y.B. INT1' LEGAL STUD. 231, 233 (1979).
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of the Treaty of Rome. 70 Early interpretations of this article had so
limited the language of the article as effectively to bar all such
complaints. 71
In an article published shortly after the Fediol decision, one com-
mentator stated:
It follows [from a review of the recent cases in the area] that
each party, who is adversely affected by a dumping determination,
has the right to judicial review . . . . After initial careful confinement
of this possibility to the facts of a rather exceptional case . . ., the
court has recently granted the right in rather broad terms to ...
complainants .... 72
Timex represents a continuation of this trend as well as an expansion
of the Fediol decision. 73 By redefining its position on individual
complainants' rights to judicial review, the court helped to eliminate
a dilemma facing complainants seeking annulment of an insufficient
antidumping duty.
The Timex decision eliminated a second dilemma for complainants
by developing a new form of relief tailored to the peculiar needs of
such complainants. 74 Prior to Timex, individuals wishing to challenge
"I Treaty of Rome, supra note 14, art. 173; see supra note 64 and accompanying
text.
1' See supra note 63.
72 Vermulst, supra note 61, at 146-47. The movement of the Court of Justice
toward a broader concept of judicial review parallels and may have been influenced
by the extensive judicial review procedure in the American Trade Agreements Act,
and may indicate that the Community is moving toward a more adjudicatory approach
to antidumping law. Id. at 147.
11 See supra notes 55 and 68.
74 Timex, No. 264/82, at 19. After stating that article 1 of Regulation 1882/82
is void, the court instituted the new form of relief without elaboration, stating
simply:
However, the aim of the action is not to have the provision in question
declared void, but to have it replaced by a more stringent measure fixing
a higher anti-dumping duty on mechanized watches and imposing such a
duty on mechanical watch movements. The anti-dumping duty imposed by
the provision declared void should therefore be maintained, in accordance
with the second paragraph of article 174 of the EEC Treaty, until the
competent institutions adopt the measures needed to comply with this
judgment.
Id.
Article 174, paragraph 2, of the treaty states:
In the case of a regulation, . . . the Court of Justice shall, if it considers
this necessary, state which of the effects of the regulation which it has
declared void shall be considered as definitive.
Treaty of Rome, supra note 14, art. 174.
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an insufficient duty were usually limited to a single remedy: to seek
annulment of the existing duty hoping that a new one would be
adopted in its place. 75 This "solution" had the anomalous result of
worsening the complainant's position in the interim between annul-
ment and adoption of a new duty. In cases where severe injury was
already occurring as a result of the dumping,7 6 the prospect of having
no duty during the interim served as a great deterrent to justify
annulment actions that might otherwise have been brought by com-
plainants.
Thus, the only alternative offered to complainants prior to Timex
was resignation to the status quo. Obviously, such a response failed
to bring the inadequacy of the existing duty to the attention of the
proper institutions. Such inaction conveyed a false indication of
general satisfaction to these institutions, providing them no incentive
to alter existing duties.
Complete annulment thus proved wholly inadequate to address the
needs of complainants regarding an insufficient duty.7 7 The court in
Timex remedied this situation by allowing the existing duty to remain
in operation until the competent institutions adopt a more suitable
duty.7 8 This solution provides a certain degree of protection for the
complainants during the period between annulment and adoption of
a new duty.
79
11 Actions for annulment have their origins in the Treaty of Rome. After stating
the jurisdictional considerations for the Court of Justice, the treaty states simply,
"If the action [before the court] is well founded, the Court of Justice shall declare
the act concerned to be void." Treaty of Rome, supra note 14, art. 174; see also
id. articles 164-188 (describing the jurisdiction of the court).
76 Article 4 of Regulation 3017/79 requires that injury be proven before an
antidumping duty may be properly levied. Council Regulation 3017/79, supra note
13, at No. L339/6. Complainants seeking increased duties, therefore, of necessity
have to plead or imply that injury is continuing despite the adopted duty, to have
their claims adjudicated. See Timex, No. 264/82, at 6 (pleading the insufficiency of
the adopted duty and implying continued injury).
7 Recognition of such inadequacy may be the reason for the court's adoption
of the new form of relief without comment. See supra note 74 and accompanying
text.
71 Timex, No. 264/82, at 19.
71 The court had previously instituted a similar form of relief in Commission v.
Council, 1973 E.C.R. 575 (1973), in which a council regulation presenting a scale
for staff salaries within the Community institutions was declared void, but was
allowed to remain in effect until the complete adoption of a new scale. Id. at 586;
see L. BROWN AND F. JACOBS, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
110 (1983).
[Vol. 16:179
19861 Timex Corp. v. Council
The third advancement made by the Court of Justice in Timex
concerns the level of information provided to complainants by the
Commission in antidumping proceedings. 80 Prior to Timex, the Com-
80 Article 8 of Regulation 3017/79 provides:
2. (a) Neither the Council, nor the Commission, nor member states,
nor officials of any of these, shall reveal any information of a confidential
nature received in pursuance of this regulation, or any information provided
on a confidential basis by a party to an anti-dumping or countervailing
investigation, without specific permission from the party submitting such
information.
(b) Each request for confidential treatment shall indicate why the
information is confidential and shall be accompanied by a non-confidential
summary of the information, or a statement of the reasons why the in-
formation is not susceptible to such summary.
3. Information will ordinarily be considered to be confidential if its
disclosure is likely to have a significantly adverse effect upon the supplier
or the source of such information.
Council Regulations (EEC) No. 3017/79, supra note 13, at No. L339/9.
Article 7(4)(a), however, provides:
The complainant . . . may inspect all information made available to the
Commission by any party to an investigation . . . provided that it is relevant
to the defense of [its] interests and not confidential within the meaning of
article 8 and that it is used by the Commission in the investigation. To
this end, [it] shall address a written request to the Commission, indicating
the information required.
Id. at No. L339/8 (quoted in Timex, No. 264/82, at 120). Before the Timex decision,
D.J. Gijlstra described the type of dilemma created by these sections as follows:
The question of confidentiality seems therefore not yet to be settled. It
remains to be seen how the Commission interprets its obligation to refrain
from disclosing other undertakings' business secrets. It seems to be difficult
to protect, on the one hand, business secrets, and, on the other, to rely
on certain protected information in a statement of objections.
Gijlstra, Legal Protection in Competition Cases, 1983 L.I.E.I. 87, at 95-96 (1983);
see a discussion of cases challenging the confidentiality of information prior to
Timex, id. at 94-96.
The court significantly settled the question of withholding information in Timex
by stating a rule relatively free of the ambiguities of past rulings, declaring:
[A]I1 non-confidential information, whether supplied by a Community
undertaking or an undertaking in an non-member country, which has been
used by the Commission during its investigation and which has had a
decisive influence on its decision regarding the anti-dumping duty must be
made available to the complainant requesting it.
Timex, No. 264/82, at 16.
After a discussion of the Community's duty to protect the business secrets of
non-member countries and the need to interpret such an obligation so as to also
protect complainants' rights, the court stated:
It follows that in the present case the Commission ought to have made
every effort, as far as was compatible with the obligation not to disclose
business secrets, to provide the applicant with information relevant to the
defense of its interests, choosing, if necessary on its own initiative, the
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mission had broad discretion in determining what information would
be provided to the parties in an antidumping action., Similarly, the
Commission determined what information should be withheld from
the parties on the basis of confidentiality. 2 The Commission also
had discretion as to how the information would be distributed to the
parties.8 3 Before Timex, the court rarely, if ever, challenged the
Commission's discretionary exercise of power.8 '
While the Timex decision neither specified guidelines outlining the
requisite level of information to be given to the parties85 nor expanded
upon the definition of "confidential information, 8 6 it did give a
clear indication that some level of information is required to be given
to the parties, 7 and that no information is to be aribitrarily designated
appropriate means of providing such information.
Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
The court's treatment of the confidentiality issue seems consistent with pushing
parties and the Commission toward utilizing a system such as that promoted by
Order of the Court of March 30, 1982. Celanese Chemical Company, Inc. v. Council
and Commission of the European Communities, 1982 E.R.C. 1183 (1982). In that
case, the court held that documents or portions thereof which have been submitted
without prior agreement of the parties should be examined by the court and, after
the defendants have been heard it should be determined whether confidentiality
should be accorded. Documents which are refused confidential treatment may be
withdrawn by the applicant. "Confidential" documents are placed in a special file
open only to the parties and the court. Riesenfeld, The Treatment of Confidential
Information in Anti-Dumping Cases: A Comment on the Celanese Case, 21 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 553, 554 (1984).
SI Speaking of such broad discretion generally granted to the institutions of
administration, E. Vermulst stated:
The European Community primarily views the taking of protective meas-
ures against dumped imports as a matter of trade policy and, therefore, it
weighs the necessity of protection of domestic producers against other
Community interests. This standpoint obviously entails broad discretion for
the administering authorities and as a consequence, until recently, it was
generally believed, that the judiciary, the European Court of Justice, had
no task in supervising the action of the Council and the Commission in
this field. This belief has been shaken by the Allied Case, in which the
European Court of Justice, in a potentially far-reaching judgment, granted
the right of judicial review to foreign exporters, hurt by Community anti-
dumping measures.
Vermulst, supra note 61, at 103.
81 See Gijlstra, supra note 80 (cases showing the Commission's exercise of broad
discretionary powers in terms of confidentiality).
83 Id.
m' See supra note 81.
8 See Timex, No. 264/82, at 18.
16 Id. at 16-18 (court uses term "confidential" repeatedly without elaboration or
definition other than that provided in article 8 of Regulation No. 3017/79).
1 See id. (court utilizes affirmative language creating a duty of the Commission
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"confidential. ' 8  Clearly, the Commission may no longer deny parties
access to information by designating it confidential if a method exists
which can release the information and at the same time protect the
interests of one requesting confidentiality. 89
In short, the court implied that parties must be provided with
adequate information to prepare their cases unless overriding concerns
for confidentiality exist and no alternative methods exist for releasing
such information. 90 If no overriding concerns exist, withholding in-
formation arbitrarily is construed as a breach of Community pro-
cedural requirements. 9' As described in article 173 of the Treaty of
Rome, 92 such a breach may result in the annulment of an act of the
Council or Commission. 93
The court's decision in Timex is a complainant-oriented decision.
The decision reflects the rapid advancements currently being made
in EEC antidumping regulation. The decision indicates that the court
will now recognize the rights of individual complainants to challenge
antidumping duties and will aid complainants by eliminating some
of the risk and uncertainties previously encountered. The clarifications
and redefinitions of policy enunciated by the court in Timex will
undoubfedly open the door to more complainants bringing similar
actions.
Carlton LaTain Kell
to make every effort to provide all non-confidential information to complainants in
a useful manner).
8 See id. at 17-18 (court agrees that alternative methods existed for releasing
information to Timex which would not have threatened confidentiality, and finds
that withholding such information constituted a breach of article 173).
89 Id.
-' Id.
91 Id. at 18.
912 Treaty of Rome, supra note 14, art. 173. Article 173 states, in pertinent part,
that the Court of Justice may "review the legality of acts of the Council and the
Commission other than recommendations or opinions" on grounds of "lack of
competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of
this [tireaty or of any other rule of law relating to its application, or misuse of
powers." Id.
93 See Timex, No. 264/82, at 18-20 (court holding article I of Regulation 1882/
82 void as being adopted in breach of procedural requirements in article 7(4)(a) of
Regulation No. 3017/79).
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